Bundesauftragsverwaltung im Bereich Bundesfernstraßen - Quo vadis?
DVV Media Group
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DVV Media Group
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DE
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Hamburg
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0020-9511
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ZLB: 4-Zs 310
BBR: Z 153
IFL: I 809
BBR: Z 153
IFL: I 809
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Abstract
Die Bundesauftragsverwaltung im Bereich Bundesfernstraßen ist in den vergangenen Jahren vermehrt in die Kritik geraten; zurzeit ist sie Gegenstand der Diskussionen im Rahmen der Föderalismuskommission II. Zwar wird allgemein zugestanden, dass sie eine wichtige Rolle beim raschen Aufbau eines leistungsfähigen Fernstraßennetzes nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg gespielt hat, es wird jedoch bezweifelt, dass die aktuelle Verteilung der Zuständigkeiten in der Lage ist, die Erhaltung und den gezielten Ausbau der für die im Herzen des europäischen Binnenmarktes gelegene deutsche Volkswirtschaft essenziellen Fernstraßeninfrastruktur sicherzustellen. Darüber hinaus wäre es - gerade in Zeiten eingeschränkter finanzieller Möglichkeiten - eminent wichtig, dass die zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel effizient eingesetzt werden. Auch diesbezüglich werden Zweifel geäußert.
The Federal State administration, on behalf of the Federal Government, has been strongly criticized for some years concerning Germany's trunk roads. The core of this critique is today's disjunction of responsibility for finance and responsibility for planning and conducting. This arrangement of responsibility causes an inefficient supply of trunk roads. The reasons for inefficiency can be found by considering the principal-agent-relations which are inherent in the federal executive administration. Particularly problematic is the fact that the Federal States as agents have to cope with the different, sometimes even oppositional interests of the principals 'Federation' and 'citizens of the Federal States'. It can be shown that improvements within the established system have to be obtained through a stronger supervision by the Federation, which, in turn, would highly increase enforcement costs. That's why a paradigm change is necessary. An organizational structure is needed which bases upon incentives, the principal-agent-relations have to be simplified. The Federation should be in charge of motorways, the Federal States of the federal roads.
The Federal State administration, on behalf of the Federal Government, has been strongly criticized for some years concerning Germany's trunk roads. The core of this critique is today's disjunction of responsibility for finance and responsibility for planning and conducting. This arrangement of responsibility causes an inefficient supply of trunk roads. The reasons for inefficiency can be found by considering the principal-agent-relations which are inherent in the federal executive administration. Particularly problematic is the fact that the Federal States as agents have to cope with the different, sometimes even oppositional interests of the principals 'Federation' and 'citizens of the Federal States'. It can be shown that improvements within the established system have to be obtained through a stronger supervision by the Federation, which, in turn, would highly increase enforcement costs. That's why a paradigm change is necessary. An organizational structure is needed which bases upon incentives, the principal-agent-relations have to be simplified. The Federation should be in charge of motorways, the Federal States of the federal roads.
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Internationales Verkehrswesen
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Nr. 4
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S. 106-114